Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University Department of Agriculture and Applied Science, State of Utah Department of Health, Division of Family Health Services, Utah State Department of Agriculture, Von T. Mendenhall, Archie Hurst, Claudia Clark, Nancy G. Robinette, Barbara Prater and John/Jane Does 1 through 20 : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University
Department of Agriculture and Applied Science,
State of Utah Department of Health, Division of
Family Health Services, Utah State Department of
Agriculture, Von T. Mendenhall, Archie Hurst,
Claudia Clark, Nancy G. Robinette, Barbara Prater
and John/Jane Does 1 through 20 : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marcus G. Theodore; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant; Paul S. Felt; Mark O. Moris; Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker; Attorneys for Defendants/Appelles Utah State University, Von T. Mendenhall and Barbara
Prater.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Dan R. Larsen; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellees State of Utah Dept. of Health, Division of Family Services, Utah Dept. of
Agriculture, Archie Hurst, Claudia Clark and Nancy G. Robinette.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University Department of Agriculture and Applied Science, No. 900410 (Utah
Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2788
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MEADOW FRESH FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, STATE 
OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, DIVISION OF FAMILY 
HEALTH SERVICES, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
VON T. MENDENHALL, ARCHIE 
HURST, CLAUDIA CLARK, NANCY 
G. ROBINETTE, BARBARA PRATER 




Case No. 900410-CA 
Priority No.v 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION 
OF FAMILY SERVICES, UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, ARCHIE HURST, CLAUDIA CLARK AND 
NANCY G. ROBINETTE 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, PRESIDING 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
500 East 466 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 359-8622 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
PAUL S. FELT 
MARK O. MORRIS 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Utah State University, Von T. 
Mendenhall and Barbara Prater 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN (4865) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1016 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees State of Utah 
Dept. of Health, Division 
of Family Services, Utah Dept. 
of Agriculture, Archie Hurst, 
Claudia Clark and Nancy G. 
Robinette P l l C H 
ff M XMkMHk* PKBfMI I M M P ^ 
FEB 131991 
OOurU OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MEADOW FRESH FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, STATE 
OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, DIVISION OF FAMILY 
HEALTH SERVICES, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
VON T. MENDENHALL, ARCHIE 
HURST, CLAUDIA CLARK, NANCY 
G. ROBINETTE, BARBARA PRATER 
and JOHN/JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 
20, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 900410^CA 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION 
OF FAMILY SERVICES, UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, ARCHIE HURST, CLAUDIA CLARK AND 
NANCY G. ROBINETTE 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, PRESIDING 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
500 East 466 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 359-8622 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
PAUL S. FELT 
MARK O. MORRIS 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Utah State University, Von T. 
Mendenhall and Barbara Prater 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN (4865) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1016 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees State of Utah 
Dept. of Health, Division 
of Family Services, Utah Dept. 
of Agriculture, Archie Hurst, 
Claudia Clark and Nancy G. 
Robinette 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE 
DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 8 
POINT II: PLAINTIFF CANNOT RAISE ISSUES FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 14 
CONCLUSION 15 
-i-
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
CASES CITED 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc./ v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 
513 P. 2d 429 (1973) 3, 9 
Gardiner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 
1982) 9 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). . 3, 14 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) 9 
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 733 P.2d 
130 (Utah 1987) 8 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 
19 90) 15 
Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980) 11, 12 
STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1987) 3, 5, 7, 8, 14 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) 4, 7 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-103, 3 
-ii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MEADOW FRESH FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, STATE 
OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, DIVISION OF FAMILY 
HEALTH SERVICES, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
VON T. MENDENHALL, ARCHIE 
HURST, CLAUDIA CLARK, NANCY 
G. ROBINETTE, BARBARA PRATER 
and JOHN/JANE DOES 1 THROUGH 
20, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ARCHIE HURST 
CLAUDIA CLARK AND NANCY G. ROBINETTE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying plaintiff's 
motion to set aside an order of dismissal for failure to 
prosecute. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, 
which was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
Case No. 900410-CA 
Priority No. 16 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the order of dismissal for 
plaintiff's failure to prosecute? An appellate court will not 
reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a 
judgment unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. 
Airkem Intermountain/ Inc., v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 
429, 431 (1973). 
2. Whether plaintiff is barred from raising his claim 
regarding the refiling statute because he failed to raise it in 
the lower court? A matter not raised in the trial court may not 
be raised for the first time on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 
P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1987): 
78-12-40. Effects of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if 
he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or 
failure. 
Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
Statement of the Rule: 
- 3 -
(1) If a default judgment has not been 
entered by the plaintiff within 60 days of 
the availability of default and absent a 
showing of good cause, the court shall 
dismiss the case without prejudice for lack 
of prosecution. 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for 
trial has not been served and filed within 
180 days of the filing date and absent a 
showing of good cause, the court shall 
dismiss the case without prejudice for lack 
of prosecution. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
: j. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud# 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect , , 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaint i ff, Meadow l*--- '• irms, Inc., i i J ed the instant 
action or. January 1 ih*? <- ieging that defendants were 
negligent their analysis s Meadow Fresh Farms imitation milk 
products (R. 20-36). *. • .> -f action was dismissed 
for failure to prosecute - - Januar* . . ••im, -^i^e J. 
I'ennjfc l'*"]'e«J«^r i fk, Third District Court Judge (F ~ On May 
22, 1990, Judge Frederics iMiiejeJ fin, « i Jf i 'lenyinq plaintiff's 
motion to set aside the order of dismissal |H, 4HI-8/) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed its original Summons and Complaint 
against defendants on April 25, 1983, alleging defendants issued 
false information about plaintiffs imitation milk products in 
several news releases and policy statements made in May through 
September of 1981. (See Addendum "A"; July 10, 1981, News 
Release). On July 19, 1984, plaintiff's counsel filed a notice 
of withdrawal of counsel and served it upon defendants (R. 364-
65). The Honorable Scott Daniels, Third District Court Judge, 
dismissed plaintiff's complaint on September 27, 1985, for 
failure to prosecute (R. 368). 
On January 26, 1987, attorneys B. H. Harris and Joseph 
M. Chambers filed an entry of appearance and a motion to vacate 
the minute entry dismissing plaintiff's case (R. 370-75). On 
March 13, 1987, Judge Daniels denied plaintiff's motion to vacate 
the judgment of dismissal (R. 379-81). 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 
of dismissal and allowed plaintiff one year to refile under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953), as amended (R. 383). 
On January 14, 1988, attorneys B. H. Harris, George W. 
Preston and Thomas L. Willmore filed an amended complaint on 
behalf of the plaintiff which forms the basis of this appeal (R. 
20-36). On December 14, 1988, B. H. Harris, one of the attorneys 
of record for plaintiff, withdrew as counsel (R. 424-25). 
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Attuimey H a n is• notice of withdrawal f counsel was mailed to 
Mr. Roy Brog, President < Fn i 
Ori December 5, 1989, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
rim in mi I'11 st r iii t ('in lit J u d g p , i s s u e d HJ o r d e r t o s h o w c a u s e w h y t h e 
case should not be dismissed f< : "osecute 
(R. 432, 33) He explained that counsel's failure to appear 
wni'iiliJ t»p CM in • nifred acquiescence in entry of an order of 
dismissal (Id..). The order to s I: i c >w c a u s e w a s • s e n t 1: o a 11 3 r n ey 
George W. Preston, attorney of record for plaintiff (Id,). 
*-.*<• ', 19o5, ac o.^v ~.*n., the order to show :' 
cause came - , regularly for hearing (R. 4 35) . i :c >ui isel fc : i : the 
plaintiff failed to appear (.Id. ) Judge Frederick entered an 
order • : f d i sri tl ssa] * i 1 :hoi it prejudice on January 18, 1990 (.Id. ) . 
On February 22, 1990, attorney Steven Y, Alder filed a 
notice of appearance of counsel and a motion to set aside the 
order :. .=-..; ' - - t
 Lff explained that he had 
failec to communicate with his previous attorney from Jaiiiiaiy to 
early December of 1989 (Ld. ) U d g e Frederick entered an order 
on May 2. - * ill.- ii lion for an order to set 
aside the order of dismissal 1H, 48 J • H f *w Addendum B" ; 
Order). 
(JI i in i • w i l l - I it1 f (j it" f hi * 11 i s in 1 s "i r J I , o n M a y x ** ; 'J b U , 
plaintiff filed a third action against defendants which was 
identical to his previous two actions. (See Brief of Appellant 
-6-
at pp. 18-19). The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District 
Court Judge, dismissed the third action without prejudice on 
December 7, 1990, by reason of this appeal from Judge Frederick's 
order (See Addendum "C", Order). Plaintiff now appeals Judge 
Frederick's order denying defendants' motion to set aside the 
order of dismissal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff claims the lower court abused its discretion 
in refusing to set aside the order of dismissal for failure to 
prosecute. Plaintiff argues that its failure to communicate with 
counsel for almost a year constitutes "excusable neglect" under 
Rule 60(b)(1). In contrast, Utah case law expressly rejects the 
argument that a plaintiff's failure to communicate with counsel 
constitutes excusable neglect sufficient to set aside an order of 
dismissal for failure to prosecute. In light of the fact that 
plaintiff's cause of action is nearly a decade old, has been 
lingering in the judicial system for more than seven years, was 
previously dismissed for lack of prosecution, and was affirmed on 
appeal as appropriately dismissed, the lower court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to set aside the order of dismissal 
for failure to prosecute. 
Plaintiff also requests this Court to decide whether he 
may refile his cause of action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 
(1987), but only if this Court affirms the lower court's 
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dismissal. Because plaintiff did not raise the issue in the 
lower court, this Court should not consider this issue raised for 
the first time on appeal. In any event, plaintiff essentially 
requests this Court to issue an advisory opinion, a result which 
is against judicial policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
Plaintiff contends that the lower court erred in 
refusing to set aside the order of dismissal for failure to 
prosecute. He asserts that "excusable neglect" existed 
justifying from relief from the final judgment of dismissal. He 
requests this Court to reverse the lower court's dismissal and 
remand this case for trial. Plaintiff's claim should be 
rejected. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules Civil Procedure, provides that a 
trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment if 
"excusable neglect" is established. The Utah Supreme Court 
defines "'excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due diligence' 
by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." 
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 733 P.2d 130, 132 
(Utah 1987). While the Court has explained that a trial court 
should be generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside 
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where there is reasonable justification or excuse, the mere fact 
that some basis may exist to set aside the default "does not 
require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in 
refusing to do so when facts and circumstances support the 
refusal." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 92 (Utah 1986). More 
specifically, the Court has ruled that where a party has been 
negligent by not communicating with his attorney, the party may 
not claim his attorney's neglect in failing to notify him of 
proceedings as grounds for setting aside a default judgment. 
Gardiner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 
1982). See also Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 
65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973). 
In the present case, plaintiff contended in the lower 
court that he satisfied the conditions of Rule 60(b) due to 
"excusable neglect on behalf of the defendant and/or plaintiff or 
plaintiff's counsel and failure in communications which resulted 
in confusion as to whether counsel had withdrawn from 
representation or not." (R. 186-87). This explanation, however, 
was rejected by Judge Frederick as insufficent to set aside the 
dismissal. Reviewing plaintiff's conduct in this case, it is 
readily apparent that Judge Frederick was correct in concluding 
that plaintiff's dilatory conduct was inexcusable. 
The original complaint in this action was filed on 
April 25, 1983, more than seven years prior to Judge Frederick's 
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dismissal. Approximately fifteen months after the original 
filing, plaintiff's original counsel of record withdrew from the 
case (R. 364). The reason stated for the withdrawal was that 
plaintiff had recently reorganized and had retained in-house 
counsel in the process (.Id.). Also, plaintiff had never paid any 
of the bills that the original law firm had submitted (Id.. ) . On 
August 29, 1985, an order to show cause was issued notifying 
plaintiff that its action was in jeopardy and that a hearing 
would be held on September 27, 1985 (R. 366). On the day of the 
hearing, plaintiff and its counsel failed to appear and the case 
was dismissed (I_d. ) . 
Sixteen months thereafter, on January 26, 1987, 
plaintiff filed a notice of appearance of counsel and request for 
scheduling conference (R. 370). This occurred more than two and 
a half years after plaintiff's original counsel had withdrawn. 
On the same day, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the minute 
entry dismissing its case (R. 372). On March 13, 1987, Judge 
Scott Daniels issued an order denying plaintiff's motion to 
vacate (R. 378). Plaintiff appealed the order to the Utah 
Supreme Court which affirmed, but granted plaintiff one year in 
which to refile its action. 
Ten months later, on January 6, 1988, plaintiff filed 
its Amended Complaint (R. 385). After two more years of 
inactivity by plaintiff, the lower court on December 5, 1989, 
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issued an order to show cause indicating that "failure to appear 
will be considered acquiescence in entry of an order of 
dismissal." (R. 431). Plaintiff and its counsel once again 
failed to appear at the order to show cause hearing and the 
action was dismissed on January 18, 1990 (R. 434) (See Addendum 
"B"; Order). 
On March 15, 1990, plaintiff moved to set aside the 
dismissal, asking the lower court to excuse his dilatory behavior 
(R. 183-90). He contended that the failure to appear at the 
order to show cause hearing was due to his and his counsel's 
confusion as to whether or not he was indeed represented by 
counsel. (.Id.) This contention was not, however, supported by 
the record. Although it was correct that attorney B. H. Harris 
withdrew from the case on December 14, 1988, he did so only on 
his own behalf due to his appointment as a judge in the First 
Circuit Court (R. 171). Had plaintiff contacted his attorney 
over the next eleven months leading up to the lower court's order 
to show cause, any confusion would easily have been remedied. 
Plaintiff's alleged confusion did not relieve it of its 
duty to diligently prosecute its case. The reasoning of the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 
(Utah 1980) is helpful. In Wilson, the plaintiffs contended that 
they should be relieved from the lower court's dismissal for 
failure to prosecute because their predecessor in interest, Mr. 
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Baldwin, had unknowingly been without counsel when the action was 
dismissed. In response, the Wilson Court stated: "It is . . . 
immaterial that Plaintiff's predecessor was unwittingly without 
counsel for a time before his death. Mr. Baldwin was not 
relieved of his duty to pursue his action by any failure of his 
attorney to act - the matter should have been investigated within 
a reasonable time." Wilson, 613 P.2d at 768. 
Likewise, plaintiff was not relieved of its duty to 
diligently prosecute this action due to any confusion as to 
whether or not it was represented by counsel. Just as when 
plaintiff's first action was dismissed, it was the district 
court's own motion that renewed plaintiff's interest in the case. 
Had the Court not moved sua sponte to dismiss, this case would 
likely have remained idle. 
Additionally, defendants have been prejudiced by 
plaintiff's delay in prosecuting this action. Since the original 
filing of this action more than seven years ago, defendants have 
undergone a considerable change of circumstances. None of the 
three named individuals represented by the Attorney General's 
Office are still employed with the State agencies against whom 
this lawsuit was filed (R. 323). One of the three is still 
employed by the State, but in a different agency and in an 
entirely different capacity (Id.). Of the other two, one has 
moved to Texas, and the other to the State of Washington (Id.). 
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Neither of these two individuals have any continuing 
employer/employee relations with the State of Utah. The changes 
of occupation and domicile have created difficulties and 
prejudice for each of the named defendants and the agencies 
involved in the lawsuit. 
There are numerous reasons why a reinstatement of this 
case would be a continuing burden on the parties involved. 
First, reinstating the lawsuit would create a burden on the 
individual defendants who would have to interrupt their personal 
and business lives to travel to Utah in order to defend their 
actions which occurred nearly a decade ago. Second, it would be 
an undue burden on the agencies involved. Because none of the 
individual defendants are currently employed by the defendant 
agencies, other agency employees would be required to become 
familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this 
action. These agency employees would have the difficulty of 
trying to familiarize themselves with a matter that occurred 
almost a decade ago. Lastly, after lingering in the court system 
for more than seven years, witnesses may no longer be available 
for trial, and if available, may be unable to recall information 
that is vital in defending this action. 
In sum, plaintiff has been afforded ample opportunity 
to prosecute this case. Plaintiff, however, has abused the 
opportunity. After seven years of delay and two dismissals for 
-13-
lack of prosecution, plaintiff requests the judicial system to 
condone his behavior by allowing him a third chance. In light of 
plaintiff's dilatory behavior, Judge Frederick's ruling should 
not be considered an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RAISE ISSUES FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL. 
On appeal, plaintiff raises the issue of whether it 
may, for a second time, utilize the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-40 (1987) which allows a plaintiff to refile an action 
within one year after the reversal or failure of a cause of 
action other than upon the merits. However, because this issue 
was not raised in the lower court, it should not be considered on 
appeal. 
Utah courts have long held that appellate issues must 
be first raised in the trial court. In James v. Preston, 746 
P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987), this Court explained that "matters not 
raised in the pleading nor put in issue at the trial level may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal." Ld. at 801. 
In the instant case, the issue of the legality of a 
second refiling was not raised below and the lower court had no 
"opportunity to make findings of fact or conclusions of law." 
James, 746 P.2d at 801. Admittedly, plaintiff did raise the 
issue in the subsequent action filed before Judge Rigtrup. 
However, Judge Rigtrup's dismissal was not based on that issue 
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and no appeal was taken. Had plaintiff desired a ruling on the 
refiling statute, he could have raised the issue before Judge 
Frederick in his motion to set aside the judgment. Plaintiff 
should not be permitted to seek reversal of Judge Frederick's 
ruling on the basis of a legal argument not presented below. 
In reality, plaintiff's argument is premature. If this 
Court reverses Judge Frederick's dismissal order, the issue will 
be moot. If this Court affirms Judge Frederick's ruling and 
plaintiff refiles its cause of action, the issue can then be 
argued and decided. In that Utah has a longstanding judicial 
policy avoiding advisory opinions, plaintiff's premature claim 
should not be considered in this appeal. See Reynolds v. 
Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully 
request this Court to affirm the lower court's denial of 
plaintiff's motion to set aside the order of dismissal. 
DATED this (V <day of February, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN" 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
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STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
147 North 200 West Salt Lake City Utah 84103 801/S33 5421 
Ju ly 10, 1981 
N E W S E 5 L E A S E 
WARNING ISSUED ON IMITATION MILK PRODUCT 
A new food product is currently being marketed throughout the 
state which is falsely represented and may pose a health risk for 
certain individuals. The product called "Meadow Fresh" is an imita-
tion lowfat milk and is offered to consumers on a distributor basis. 
According to Archie Hurst, Director of the Division of Food 
and Consumer Services* for the Utah Department of Agriculture, "Consumers 
should be aware that Meadow Fresh is improperly labeled and makes 
false advertising claims." "Meadow Fresh is an imitation product 
and should not be considered a dairy product or a substitute for 
milk," says Mr. Hurst. 
Contrary to advertising claims, Meadow Fresh is not nutritionally 
comparable to milk. It is, in fact, inferior to milk in several 
nutrients, which is the reason for it being classified as an imita-
tion product. 
"The Department is concerned that dietary detriment may result 
to individuals using this product as a sole replacement for milk, 
especially for infants, growing children, the elderly and pregnant 
and nursing mothers," says Mr. Hurst. "It is important that the 
product not be used as an infant formula." 
Janet Heins , a Public Health Nutritionist for the Utah State ^ 
O 
Department of Health and Director of the WIC Program, states that K 
"Meadow Fresh does not meet the minimum standards of the Infant ^ 
Formula Act of 1980. This act establishes minimum levels of nutrients " 
and standards for quality and safety in the manufacture of infant 
formula. Furthermore, Meadow Fresh may not support normal infant 
growth and development, and prolonged use of it in infant feeding 
could be life threatening." 
OR KENNETH B CREER 
COMMISSIONER 
News Release 
Warning Issued on Imitation Milk Product 
July 10, 1981 
Page 2 
Meadow Fresh has also been purported to be useful for persons 
who are allergic to milk. The Department is not aware of any 
evidence to substantiate this claim. Components present in the 
product indicate that persons allergic to milk would also be 
allergic to Meadow Fresh. 
In addition, ingredients present in the product have not been 
proven to be effective in the treatment or cure of any known disease. 
Mr. Hurst says "Consumers should also be aware that the nutri-
tion information declared on the label is inaccurate." The label 
states that the, product does not contain cholesterol when, in fact, 
it does. 
During the past few months, Meadow Fresh has prompted manv 
consumer inquiries to the Department. 
"We are very concerned that consumers may be misled by the 
advertising claims made of this product,M says Mr.Hurst. 
© 
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PAUL S. FELT (A1055) 
MARK 0. MORRIS (A4636) 
RAY, QUINNEY t NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Utah State University 
Department of Agriculture and Applied 
Science, Von T. Mendenhall and 
Barbara Prater 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MEADOW FRESH FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SET 
ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 880900171 
Judge J, Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff's motion for an order to set aside this 
Court's January 18, 1990 Order of Dismissal without prejudice 
was noticed for decision on April 30, 1990. After having reviewed 
all of the pleadings in the case and after having reviewed the 
»emoranda of points and authorities submitted in connection 
with plaintiff's motion to set aside order of dismissal, including 
the exhibits attached thereto, and for good cause shown, 
EXHIBIT A 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaint 
motion for order to set aside this Court's January 18# 1990 
Order of Dismissal without prejudice is denied for the reasons 
©ore particularly set forth in the defendants' memoranda in 
opposition to plaintiff's motion. 
DATED this ^?A day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. Dennis Frederick 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Order 
was served upon the following by depositing a copy^of the same 
in the U. S. MaiIs, postage prepaid thereon, this °\ day of 
M^y, 1990: ^ 
John P. Soltis 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Steven F. Alder 
ALDER & ASSOCIATES 
220 East 3900 South #16 
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Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
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C*K"IY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MEADOW FRESH FARMS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 900902988CV 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
ooOoo 
Defendants' motion to dismiss came before this Court for 
regularly scheduled hearing at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, November 26, 
1990. Plaintiff was represented by Marcus G. Theodore. The State 
of Utah and its related departments and individuals were 
represented by Dan R. Larsen. Defendants Utah State University 
and its related departments and individual defendants were 
represented by Mark O. Morris. After considering the memoranda on 
file and hearing arguments of counsel, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case be dismissed without 
prejudice by reason of the appeal now pending of Civil No. 
C88-00171, the predecessor case to this instant action. 
DATED this / -^dav of December, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Kenneth Rigtrup 
District Court Jtiidge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of November, 1990, 
d true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal was 
served upon the following by depositing a copy of the same in the 
U.S. Mails, postage prepaid thereon: 
Dan R. Larsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Marcus G. Theodore 
466 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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